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English Mental Health
Reform: Lessons from
Ontario?
Peter Bartlett1
Reforms in areas related to mental disability are under debate in England to an extent
unprecedented for almost half a century. The Law Commission’s proposals on incapacity,
following further consultation from the Lord Chancellor’s Department, have now largely been
accepted in principle by the government for legislative enactment at some time in the
undetermined future.2 A joint green paper from the Home Office and the Department of Health
has established a policy agenda concerning the governance of people with serious personality
disorders.3 Proposals by an expert committee chaired by Professor Genevra Richardson on mental
health reform have likewise been followed up by a government green paper,4 and the two green
papers have in turn resulted in a joint white paper on reform of the Mental Health Act 1983.5
All this takes place as the Human Rights Act 1998 takes effect, with its guarantees relating to liberty
and security of the person, standards for hearings, respect for private and family life, and
protection from inhuman or degrading treatment. Throughout the development of the reforms, a
number of similar themes have recurred, involving civil rights, the provision of appropriate legal
processes, anti-discrimination, the respect for people with capacity, the extension of controls into
the community, and the safety both of people with mental disabilities and of the public as a whole.
At least in the public arena, most of the debate has focussed on the English situation. The premise
of this paper is that the situation in the rest of the world may have something to teach us. 
The paper examines the law of Ontario. While it focuses primarily on those issues related to the
Richardson Report and its subsequent government response, Ontario legislation divides issues
somewhat differently to English law, and thus overlap with the other reform proposals is inevitable. 
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Historical Overview
The contemporary history of mental health law in Ontario conveniently begins in 1967, with the
passage of a new Mental Health Act.6 In its general themes, it is comparable to the English Mental
Health Act 1959. Both can be understood as broadly deferential to doctors’ views, with admission
criteria acknowledging a considerable degree of medical discretion, subject to review by an
administrative tribunal. Both were silent on treatment issues. Unlike the English legislation, issues of
incapacity were dealt with primarily under a separate statute, the Mental Incompetency Act.
Nonetheless, where previously Ontario psychiatric inpatients had routinely lost the control of their
estates, the 1967 act provided a system of routine assessments by the admitting physician of
inpatient’s capacity to manage their financial affairs, with the Public Trustee taking over management
of the estates of those lacking such capacity, a system not reflected in the English legislation.
Significant revisions to the Ontario Mental Health Act were made in 1978. Where the 1967 act can
be seen as reflecting developments in England, the 1978 act can be seen as anticipating them.
Treatment provisions were introduced for the first time, on much the same model that would appear
five years later in England: treatment of voluntary patients would be governed by common law,
treatment of involuntary patients would be either by consent of the patient or else with a second
opinion provided by a psychiatrist. Unlike the English system introduced in 1983, however, there
was in Ontario no three-month grace period where treatment could be given without consent or
second opinion, and the imposition of treatment without consent became subject to review by the
administrative tribunal. Where the involuntary patient lacked capacity, consent could be provided
by the patient’s nearest relative as defined in the act, although no right of review was available to a
doctor’s decision regarding incapacity. Rights to view the clinical record were introduced at this
time, although later strengthened considerably. A right to a tribunal review of the admitting
physician’s decision that the patient lacked financial capacity was introduced. More important for
the body of this paper, amendments were made to the criteria for involuntary admission. Where the
1983 English act continued with vague criteria referring to the health or safety of the patient and the
protection of others, the Ontario statute defined dangerousness in considerable detail.
To this point, the Ontario law had developed according to the evolution of political and
professional thinking. The next set of amendments was forced by broader constitutional
considerations. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was introduced to the Canadian
constitution in 1982. Along with enshrining rights for example to liberty and security of the person
and to due process upon arrest or detention, section 15 of the Charter protected against non-
discrimination on the basis, inter alia, of mental handicap. The implementation of section 15 was
delayed until 1986, to allow the amendment of legislation to comply with the section. Amendment
of the Mental Health Act was thus effectively forced upon the Ontario legislature. There was no
consensus in the governing Liberal Party as to how to proceed: the Minister of Health, reflecting the
perceived view of the medical establishment, did not favour major legislative amendment
notwithstanding the introduction of the Charter provisions; the Attorney General, who would have
had to defend the legislation in court, was much more open to changes. In the end, the matter was
forced by amendments proposed and spearheaded by the opposition New Democratic Party.7
6 S.O. 1967, c. 51, contained in the following decennial
statutory consolidation as R.S.O.1970, c. 269.
7 The amendments were introduced by the Equality Rights
Statute Law Amendment Act, 1986, S.O. 1986, c. 64
and the Mental Health Amendment Act, 1987, S.O.
1987, c. 37, both amending the Mental Health Act,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 262.
English Mental Health Reform: Lessons from Ontario?
29
The 1986 amendments were significant for a number of reasons. Procedural protections were
clarified and strengthened. Patients who had capacity to do so were given the right to appoint the
person who would serve as their substitute decision-maker in the event that they later lost capacity.
Children admitted on the consent of their guardians (called ‘informal’ patients following the
amendments)8 were given rights to tribunal review of their admissions. Most important for this
paper, however, was the affirmation that a patient with capacity had the right to refuse treatment,
whether that patient was voluntarily or involuntarily admitted to the hospital, and this refusal
could not be overridden. The act further stipulated that patients lacking capacity could be treated
on the consent of their substitute decision-maker, and detailed instructions were provided as to
how this individual was to exercise that authority. The decision of the substitute would be based
on the wishes of the patient when competent; or if none were known, best interests as defined by
the statute.9 For the first time, the decision of a treating physician that a patient lacked capacity
could be appealed to the review board. A provision allowing the refusal of the substitute to be
overridden in the best interests of the patient was struck out by litigation as contrary to the
equality provisions of the Charter.10 The result was that rights to consent to psychiatric treatment
became entirely separate from admission status, although at this time both were still contained in
the same legislation, the Mental Health Act.
This approach was taken a step further in 1992. Legislation regarding personal and financial
guardianship had long been acknowledged in need of reform. The relevant legislation, the Mental
Incompetency Act,11 involved unwieldy court processes, and did not allow for partial guardianship
arrangements beyond the distinction between financial and personal matters: an individual could
manage all or none of their property and estate, and/or all or none of their personal affairs, but
nothing in between. No more specific orders were possible. Some legislative tinkering had been
done, such as the introduction of enduring powers of attorney for financial (but not personal)
matters in 1983,12 but no one was particularly satisfied with the state of the law. Various
committees and inquiries had been struck,13 but reform had languished in an absence of consensus
and political will. A change of government in 1990 brought the political will, with the election of
the New Democratic Party.
8 Prior to 1996, Ontario law had followed the English
style of categorising patients as involuntary (i.e., civilly
confined) or informal (i.e., inpatients not civilly
confined). Notwithstanding the legal definitions, the
latter were generally referred to as ‘voluntary’, and the
1996 legislation amended the legal terminology to reflect
this usage. ‘Informal’ became the term used for those
aged from 12 to 16 who were admitted to the facility on
the consent of another, usually the parent but sometimes
a legal guardian or social services authority. For
consistency, this paper will refer to adults not civilly
confined as ‘voluntary’ even when the reference is prior
to 1996, when ‘informal’ would technically have been
the correct term.
9 Creating sections 1a(6) and 35(5) of the Mental
Health Act then in force, reflected in the 1990 statutory
consolidation as R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 2(6) and 49(5)
respectively.
10 Fleming v. Reid (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 74 (O.C.A.).
11 This was based in the 1909 Lunacy Act, 9 Edw. VII, c.
37 (Ont.), itself really a codification of Victorian law.
Amendments in 1911 slightly expanded the definition of
incapacity, and new terminology was introduced in
1937. Otherwise, the act remained largely unchanged
until its repeal in 1992: see R.S.O. 1970, c. 271, R.S.O.
1980, c. 264, R.S.O. 1990, c. M-9. Like the
corresponding portion of the English legislation
(Mental Health Act 1959, 7/8 Eliz II, c. 72, pt. VIII),
the Mental Incompetency Act was directed at people
with mental disabilities generally, not merely people
under psychiatric care in hospital.
12 S.O.1983, c. 74, s. 2.
13 Eg., Attorney General of Ontario, ‘Interim Report on
the Estates of Persons Incapable of Managing their
Property’ (August, 1985); Tri-ministerial Committee on
Guardianship (Chair: G. Sharpe) (1986); Attorney
General of Ontario, ‘Report of the Committee on those
Incapable of Managing their Affairs’ (Chair: S. Fram)
(1987); Ministry of Health, ‘Report of the Enquiry on
Mental Competence’ (Chair: D. Weistub), (Toronto:
Queen’s Printer, 1990).
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For present purposes, the 1992 reforms extended the Mental Health Act approach to the
remainder of health care decision-making. The Consent to Treatment Act 199214 provided a
statutory right of competent patients to make treatment decisions, and the list of substitutes to
make decisions in the case of incapable patients, without distinction between physical and mental
disorders. The movement of these provisions from the Mental Health Act to the Consent to
Treatment Act further articulated the division between treatment decision-making and
institutional confinement, and emphasising a similar approach to mental and physical treatment.
At the same time, new guardianship legislation covering financial and personal decisions other than
health care and mental health confinement was passed as the Substitute Decisions Act 1992.15 The
government was acutely aware of the need for effective enforcement and administration of these
statutes. As a result, these statutes in combination with yet another piece of legislation, the
Advocacy Act 1992,16 placed rights advice and advocacy on a statutory footing and created a
bureaucracy run by a board to administer rights advice and advocacy services. 
Advocacy Ontario was short-lived. Its establishment and initial operation had been controversial
and problematic for a variety of reasons, and it was abolished following a change of government
in 1995, although rights advice remains a part of the system, in a somewhat reduced form. The new
government also replaced the Consent to Treatment Act 1992 with the Health Care Consent Act
1996.17 That statute continued the broad structure of the previous statute, respecting the treatment
decisions of capable patients regarding both psychiatric and physical treatment.
In Ontario, homicides by those with psychiatric difficulties have in recent years been high profile
as they have been in England, and the government responded with Brian’s Law (Mental Health
Legislative Reform), 2000.18 This law makes minor amendments to the existing confinement
criteria, as well as adding a new ground of confinement concerning people who lack capacity to
consent to treatment and whose mental illness is both of a recurring nature and has been shown
amenable to treatment. As such, like the Richardson proposals, it would introduce a different
standard of confinement for those incapable of consenting to treatment . It also introduces a new
form of regulation of treatment outside the psychiatric facility, described as a ‘community
treatment order’. As will become clear below, this is more similar to a contract than a coercive
order, as it requires the patient if competent (and otherwise the substitute decision-maker) to
consent to the order. Consent can further be withdrawn on 72 hours notice. While the possibility
of informal coercion is of course not to be underestimated,19 this model appears to be particularly
strong on patient autonomy and, once again, does not undercut the basic position in Ontario law
that persons with capacity have a right to refuse treatment. 
14 S.O. 1992, c. 31.
15 S.O. 1992, c. 30.
16 S.O. 1992, c. 26.
17 S.O. 1996, c. 2, sch. A.
18 S.O. 2000, c. 9.
19 Regarding the prevalence of such informal coercion in
the context of ‘voluntary’ admissions to psychiatric
hospitals, see J. Gilboy and J. Schmidt ‘ “Voluntary”
hospitalization of the mentally ill’ 66 Northwestern
Law Review (1971) 429, V. A.Hiday. ‘Coercion in
Civil Commitment: Process, Preferences, and Outcome’,
15 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry
(1992) 359. Particularly good in assessing J. Monahan
et. al. ‘Coercion and commitment: Understanding
involuntary mental hospital admission’ 18 International
Journal of Law and Psychiatry (1995) 249.
English Mental Health Reform: Lessons from Ontario?
31
Lessons for England?
The Ontario law orders the regulation of mental health in a very different way to its English
counterpart. On its face, it appears to take into account many of the concerns raised regarding
English reform proposals. The Ontario Mental Health Act is acknowledged to have a policing
function: it is about public safety, reflecting similar concerns of the UK government, expressed in
its green and white papers. There is no restriction on the range of mental disorders which are
covered by the act. People with serious personality disorders are dealt with in the same way as
persons with any other mental disorder: if they are dangerous within the meaning of the Act, they
are locked up. This matches the concerns of the government contained in the proposals on people
with serious personality disorder. While dangerous people with mental disorders are dealt with
differently from dangerous people without mental disorders, a point suggesting some possible
discrimination in approach, the Ontario legislation seems otherwise to be as close to non-
discriminatory as is reasonably possible. Specifically, treatment decisions under the Health Care
Consent Act and other decisions covered by the Substitute Decisions Act are made on the basis of
ability to make the decision in question: people with psychiatric problems are dealt with in exactly
the same way as people with non-psychiatric incapacity, and psychiatric treatments in essentially
the same way as physical treatments.20 Capacity and the desire to regulate mental disorders in the
same way as physical disorders are thus given a central role as envisaged by the Richardson report,
with no sacrifice to the safety of the community. Procedural safeguards in the form both of rights
advice and review tribunals, are provided efficiently and in abundance, and human rights are
acknowledged. This seems to represent the range of concerns in the current English debate. Closer
examination of the Ontario proposals further provide guidance on how English legislation might
appropriately balance the above concerns.
Criteria and Process for Involuntary Admission
If the government is to increase the role of public safety as a guiding principle of the English
Mental Health Act, as the white paper claims,21 it ought to do so responsibly. The risk with
dangerousness criteria is that large numbers of non-dangerous people are falsely identified as
dangerous and thus inappropriately confined.22 The current English criteria, referring only to it
being ‘necessary for the health and safety of the patient or the protection of other persons’ that
the individual be admitted for treatment,23 provide no guidance as to how the appropriate
threshold of risk is to be determined and thus provides no check on the over-prediction of
dangerousness. The Richardson Report, somewhat surprisingly, does not propose any alteration of
20 The one exception is the new community treatment
orders, which apply only to treatments for mental
disorder. Even these, however, can be terminated by the
competent patient or the substitute of the incompetent
patient. The difference is thus one of notification: a
doctor must be notified if a patient goes off treatment
for mental disorder governed by the order, where no
comparable rule applies to physical disorder.
21 In the government’s words, ‘[E]xisting legislation also
failed to provide adequate public protection from those
whose risk to others arises from severe personality
disorder. We are determined to remedy this.’ White
paper, p.1.
22 See for example, P. Bowden, ‘Violence and Mental
Disorder’, in N. Walker (ed.), Dangerous People,
(London: Blackstone Press, 1996); J. Monahan, ‘Risk
Assessment of Violence Among the Mentally
Disordered: Generating Useful Knowledge’, 11
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry (1988),
249; J. Monahan and H. Steadman (eds), Violence
and mental disorder: developments in risk
assessment, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994).
23 Mental Health Act 1983, s. 3(2)(c); see also similar
wording in section 2(2)(b) regarding admission for
assessment.
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this wording. The white paper refers to ‘risk of serious harm, including deterioration of health’ or
‘significant risk of serious harm to other people’ as initial criteria for the imposition of a
compulsory assessment, although the former criterion lapses into an ill-defined best interest test
coupled with a treatability requirement when ongoing compulsion is at issue in the subsequent
compulsory assessment.24 Compare these to the 1978 Ontario criteria, contained in section 15(1)
of the Mental Health Act:
15(1) Where a physician examines a person and has reasonable cause to believe that the person,
(a) has threatened or attempted or is threatening or attempting to cause bodily harm to
himself or herself;
(b) has behaved or is behaving violently towards another person or has caused or is causing
another person to fear bodily harm from him or her; or
(c) has shown or is showing a lack of competence to care for himself or herself
and if in addition the physician is of the opinion that the person is apparently suffering
from mental disorder of a nature or quality that likely will result in,
(d) serious bodily harm to the person;
(e) serious bodily harm to another person; or
(f) imminent and serious physical impairment of the person
the physician may make application in the prescribed form for a psychiatric assessment of
the person.
Substantively similar provisions apply to allow police officers and Justices of the Peace to remove
an individual to a psychiatric facility, where the section 15 examination takes place. 
The provision makes a serious attempt to clarify what sort of behaviour will warrant confinement.
Subsections (a) through (c) make it clear that the prediction cannot be based on pure speculation:
a threat or attempt of bodily harm, violent behaviour or causing someone else to fear violent
behaviour, or a demonstrated lack of competence to care for the self is required.25 A standard of
predicted behaviour is also required: serious bodily harm or physical impairment must be likely
(not ‘possibly’) to occur. The word ‘imminent’ in subsection (f), removed by Brian’s Law in 2000,
suggested a time factor: things had to have reached or reasonably neared a crisis.26
24 White paper, para. 3.15, 3.18. The white paper
contains no obvious enforcement mechanism for the
former set of criteria, apart from judicial review.
25 The case law stops short of insisting that an ‘overt act of
commission’ be committed for subsections (a) through (c)
to take effect: Azhar v. Anderson (1985, Dist. Ct.,
unrep.), in obiter. This would seem to raise a variety of
rather tedious word-games: are threats ‘overt acts of
commission’? Is living in sufficient squalor to place
oneself at risk of serious bodily harm or serious physical
impairment an overt act? Or is it merely an omission to
care for self? If these are the sort of situation the case
holds to be included in subsections (a) to (c), the point is
unobjectionable, if unexciting. If instead the finding that
‘overt acts’ are not required is intended to imply that
predictions need not be grounded in identifiable, actually
existing prior conditions, the decision (from a lower level,
non-Superior court) must be simply wrong on this point. It
is difficult to see how the statute could be clearer.
26 The word ‘imminent’ was removed by Brian’s Law, s.
3(1), for reasons not explained in the explanatory note to
that statute. It would seem that one reason was that
there was no consensus as to what the word meant.
While it is an open question as to whether ‘imminent’ is
the appropriate word, it does seem that some form of
time frame should be understood as part of the
predictive scheme. That said, there is no obvious reason
why the risk of physical impairment should be treated
differently than the serious bodily harm referred to in
paragraphs 15(1)(d) and (e) in this respect.
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Section 3(2) of Brian’s Law 2000 adds a new and distinct set of confinement criteria to section 15:
15(1.1) Where a physician examines a person and has reasonable cause to believe that the
person,
(a) has previously received treatment for mental disorder of an ongoing or recurring nature
that, when not treated, is of a nature or quality that will result in serious bodily harm to
the person or to another person or substantial mental or physical deterioration of the
person or serious physical impairment of the person; and
(b) has shown clinical improvement as a result of the treatment,
and if in addition the physician is of the opinion that the person,
(c) is apparently suffering from the same mental disorder as the one for which he or she
previously received treatment or from a mental disorder that is similar to the previous
one;
(d) given the person’s history of mental disorder and current mental or physical condition,
is likely to cause serious bodily harm to himself or herself or to another person or is
likely to suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration or serious physical
impairment; and
(e) is apparently incapable, within the meaning of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, of
consenting to his or her treatment in a psychiatric facility and the consent of his or her
substitute decision-maker has been obtained,
the physician may make application in the prescribed form for a psychiatric assessment of the
person.
While a marked departure from the 1978 clauses, it shows some parallel structure. For the
behavioural criteria in the paragraphs 15(1)(a) to (c), this subsection substitutes specific experience
of successful treatment for mental disorder now afflicting the individual. The dangerousness
criteria of paragraph 15(1)(d) to (f) are reflected in paragraph (1.1)(d) of the new section, albeit with
the additional ground of substantial mental or physical deterioration.
Significant for current discussion, the section applies only for persons incapable of consenting to
the proposed treatment and where the consent of the substitute decision-maker has been obtained.
Where section 15(1)(c) may have implicitly created a standard of confinement in which capacity
was a relevant factor, the new subsection 15 (1.1) explicitly creates a standards of confinement
based on the treatment capacity of the potential patient. This is a direct precedent for the
Richardson proposals, which would create different criteria of compulsion based on capacity to
consent to treatment. Effectively, the proposal allows slightly earlier intervention to ensure
treatment of those lacking capacity to consent, where the substitute decision-maker consents and
when there is a track record of successful treatment for the disorder. Here again, the right of
competent patients to control their treatment is not affected: the provision applies only to those
patients lacking capacity and does not in any way restrict the allegedly incapable person from
applying for a review of his or her capacity in the usual way.
The initial admission provision allows confinement of an individual in a psychiatric facility for up
to 72 hours. There is no review provided by the Act in this period, although judicial review by way
of habeas corpus and civil actions for wrongful confinement are available, if not necessarily very
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practical. In the 72 hour period, a more extensive examination is to occur pursuant to section 20
of the act, after which a further confinement may be permitted if the attending physician takes the
view that the patient is indeed suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or quality which will
likely result in one of the conditions in subsection 15(1)(d) to (f) or 15(1.1) above if the person does
not remain in the facility, and the person is not suitable for voluntary admission. Section 20
confinements can be renewed as they approach their expiry.
The first of these section 20 confinements lasts for two weeks, the second for a month, the third
for two months, and the fourth and subsequent for three months. These time periods are
considerably shorter than the current English equivalents of twenty-eight days under a section 2
confinement, six months for the first two section 3 confinements, and one year thereafter.27 These
periods are significant both because they require the doctor to re-assess the case for confinement,
a process which may result in the doctor taking the view that confinement is no longer justified,
and also because in Ontario, as in England, the patient has a right to a review of detention by the
tribunal once per certificate. There is much to be said for the Ontario approach here, which better
reflects the time that psychiatric interventions require to take effect. A patient who opts for a
hearing at the beginning of his or her confinement would thus have a right to a second one a couple
of weeks later, as prescribed drugs are taking effect and when there may therefore be a real change
in the applicability of the confinement criteria to the patient. In England, if hearings were held
promptly (which of course they are not - more on that below), the condition of a patient opting
for a hearing at the beginning of the confinement period could have changed markedly, to the point
where the confinement criteria cease to be met, months before the patient would have the
opportunity to apply for another hearing. The fact that this system works effectively in Ontario
raises the question of whether the right to periodic review of detention established by X v. United
Kingdom28 ought to be interpreted considerably more strictly.
Informal/Bournewood Patients
The 1986 amendments to the Ontario Mental Health Act introduced the concept of an ‘informal’
patient. This is someone admitted on the authority of another, and thus bears some resemblance
to Bournewood patients.29 The Mental Health Act provision applied only to persons between the
ages of twelve and sixteen years,30 but in 1992, similar provisions were introduced regarding adults
27 See Ontario Mental Health Act, s. 20(4), and English
Mental Health Act 1983, s. 20(1) and (2). While the
English white paper abolishes the distinction between
section 2 and 3 admissions (for assessment and
treatment respectively), it does not alter the length of
compulsory orders. These will remain at 28 days for the
first order, six months for the following two, and a year
for each order thereafter: para 3.10.
28 (1981) 4 EHRR 188.
29 That is, patients of the sort at issue in R. v. Bournewood
Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte
L [1998] 3 WLR 107 (HL). These are adults who lack
the mental capacity to decide where they will live, and
merely acquiesce to remaining in hospital. At issue in the
case was whether these persons were ‘confined’, and
whether they could be admitted to psychiatric facilities as
informal patients or whether instead civil confinement
procedures needed to be applied. The House of Lords held
that informal admission was acceptable, but the case has
triggered discussion as to how such persons ought to be
dealt with in law.
30 Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 13.
Admission of minors as informal patients also occurs in
England: see R v. Kirklees Metropolitan Borough
Council, ex parte C [1993] 2 FLR 187 (CA), and
Ralph Sandland, ‘The Common law and the
“informal” minor patient’, 5:3 Journal of Forensic
Psychiatry (1994) 569. The need for a separate regime
determining the appropriateness of children in this
situation has not as yet formed part of the English
debate. Again, the Ontario legislation may provide a
model for consideration.
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in the Consent to Treatment Act and continued in the Health Care Consent Act 1996.31 Even now,
the parallel with Bournewood patients is not exact, as the Ontario legislation clearly has in mind
individuals who are not acquiescing to their admission. The acts grant objecting patients who
apparently lack the capacity to decide their own hospital admission the right to have their
admission to the psychiatric facility reviewed by tribunal. Absent such application, review of the
admission of minors under the Mental Health Act occurs automatically at the end of six months,
but there is no such routine scrutiny for adults.
The Richardson Report argues for the importance of statutory regulation covering the voluntary
admission of incompetent acquiescing patients, who cannot be expected actively to challenge their
admissions. The government’s response in the white paper suggests an approach similar to that of
Ontario: applications by the patient or their representative will be possible to challenge de facto
detentions.32 The Ontario legislation may provide a model for the criteria which might be used to
determine the appropriateness of such admissions:
34(5) In reviewing the decision to admit the person to the hospital, psychiatric facility or health
facility for the purpose of treatment, the Board shall consider,
(a) whether the hospital, psychiatric facility or health facility can provide the treatment;
(b) whether the hospital, psychiatric facility or health facility is the least restrictive setting
available in which the treatment can be administered;
(c) whether the person’s needs could more appropriately be met if the treatment were
administered in another place and whether space is available for the person in the other
place;
(d) the person’s views and wishes, if they can be reasonably ascertained; and
(e) any other matter that the Board considers relevant.33
It is clear that the admission of those who lack capacity to decide where they will live should not
be as limited in the same way as civilly confined patients. If the Law Commission proposals on
incapacity are implemented in their present form, acquiescing Bournewood patients would be
admittable on the basis of their best interests, although not confineable absent judicial
intervention.34 While the factors contained in the statutory test of best interests overlap with the
Ontario criteria somewhat and would be appropriate additions to the above factors, it is at least
arguable that the specific issues contained in the Ontario criteria ought to be specifically
considered before the admission of a Bournewood patient.
Treatment Provisions
As noted above, the Health Care Consent Act concerns all medical treatment, not merely
psychiatric treatment. The key provision for current purposes is contained in section 10, which
provides that treatment may not be given unless the practitioner offering the treatment has ensured
that the patient consents and is capable of doing so. Capacity is in turn defined by section 4(1) of
that act:
31 See Consent to Treatment Act 1992, s. 19, 32, and
Health Care Consent Act, s. 24, 34.
32 White paper, paras. 6.4, 6.11.
33 Health Care Consent Act, s. 34(5). Similar provisions
may be found regarding children as informal patients in
the Mental Health Act, s. 13(3).
34 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, para. 4.30-33,
7.13.
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4(1) A person is capable with respect to a treatment, admission to a care facility or a personal
assistance service if the person is able to understand the information that is relevant to making
a decision about the treatment, admission or personal assistance service, as the case may be, and
able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.
In this provision there is no express requirement of a mental illness or diagnosis. Unlike the
English test in Re C,35 there is no express requirement that the individual believe the information
provided. This difference is largely illusory, however, given the requirement that the individual
appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his or her choice. It would be an unusual,
but not theoretically impossible case, where the individual appreciated the foreseeable
consequences of the choice to be made, without believing the information provided.
Where the patient lacks capacity to consent, the prescribed substitute decision-maker has
authority to give or withhold consent. The substitute will be, in order of preference, a court-
appointed guardian, the holder of a power of attorney for personal care authorising the holder to
make such decisions, an individual appointed by the review board to fulfil this role, or a family
member according to a prescribed list of proximity or relationship.36 The way in which the decision
is to be made regarding treatment of the incapable patient is also closely defined by the legislation.
Consistent with the respect accorded to patient capacity, wishes expressed by the patient while
competent and over the age of sixteen years must be honoured, and only in the absence of such
wishes may resort be had to the patient’s best interests.37 ‘Best interests’ is in turn defined by
section 21(2):
21(2) In deciding what an incapable person’s best interests are, the person who gives or refuses
consent on his or her behalf shall take into consideration,
(a) the values and beliefs that the person knows the incapable person held when capable and
believes he or she would still act on if capable;
(b) any wishes expressed by the incapable person with respect to the treatment that are not
required to be followed under paragraph 1 of subsection (1) [i.e., the paragraph requiring
competent wishes to be followed]
(c) the following factors:
1. Whether the treatment is likely to,
i. improve the incapable person’s condition or well-being,
ii. prevent the incapable person’s condition or well-being from deteriorating, or
iii. reduce the extent to which, or the rate at which, the incapable person’s condition or
well-being is likely to deteriorate.
2. Whether the incapable person’s condition or well-being is likely to improve, remain the
same or deteriorate without the treatment.
35 [1994] 1 All ER 819.
36 See s. 20.
37 See s. 21(1). The right of a competent adult patient to
refuse physical treatment and the enforceability during
subsequent incapacity of wishes made regarding
physical treatment while the patient had capacity are
established in English law: see, eg., Re C (Adult:
Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819.
These rights also presumably apply in England to
treatments for mental disorder for informal patients and
those living in the community, but they cease to apply if
the individual is civilly confined. In that event, the
Mental Health Act allows most treatments to proceed
without patient consent and without any formal scrutiny
for three months, and allows patient consent to be
overridden thereafter: s. 57, 58, 63.
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3. Whether the benefit the incapable person is expected to obtain from the treatment
outweighs the risk of harm to him or her.
4. Whether a less restrictive or less intrusive treatment would be as beneficial as the treatment
that is proposed.
These criteria are binding on substitute decision-makers. While the Ontario legislation remains
deferential to the wishes of the individual expressed while competent, some flexibility is accorded
to the review tribunal within that framework:
36(3) The Board may give the substitute decision-maker permission to consent to the treatment
despite the wish [i.e., the previously expressed refusal of the patient while competent] if it is
satisfied that the incapable person, if capable, would probably give consent because the likely
result of the treatment is significantly better than would have been anticipated in comparable
circumstances at the time the wish was expressed.
Under Ontario law, unlike the English situation following F v. West Berkshire Health Authority,38 the
doctor never makes the final decision as to whether treatment will be given, and the person making
that decision on behalf of a person lacking capacity must decide according to a specific set of
criteria. Once again, Ontario adopts an approach requiring specificity.
The intent of the Ontario system was to ensure that there would always be a second view of the
doctor’s proposal for treatment, a reality check serving a function analogous to informed consent
by a competent patient, ensuring that the proposal was appropriate for the patient’s particular
circumstances. This second view has been the case for mental health in Ontario since 1978.39 In the
early years, the approach did not entirely fulfil this objective. The perception among patient rights
advocates was that it was treated more as an obligation to inform family members of treatment
rather than as scrutiny prior to consent, and in any event, it was thought that families tended to be
too deferential to the medical views even when they conflicted with the patient’s earlier, competent
choices. For this reason, the closer guidance as to how consent should be given was included in the
1986 amendments. This, along with some administrative back-up to the provisions to inform
substitutes of the criteria, has probably improved matters in this regard. It is difficult to see that it
is sufficient to provide any real check on appropriateness of proposed treatments, however, as the
person providing consent will in practice rely upon the advice provided by the doctor, advice which
will normally point to the desirability of treatment. Appropriate audit structures may thus be a
more effective mechanism of professional scrutiny, although one which is again likely to reflect
medical values. That said, the Ontario provisions did introduce clearer guidance to doctors and
substitute decision-makers as to how decisions regarding treatment are to be made.
One object of the 1986 reforms had been to force a second, non-medical opinion for the patient
who was incapable, but was acquiescing to treatment. Treatment on this basis had been illegal
without the consent of the substitute since 1978, but the experience of the patient rights bar was
that such consent was nonetheless often not obtained. While publicity surrounding the law may
have altered this to some degree, particularly in extreme cases, it is not clear that it has solved the
problem. There remains anecdotal evidence that psychiatrists are negotiating treatment regimes
with patients of at best marginal capacity, to avoid the perceived administrative hassle of
38 [1989] 2 All ER 545 (HL).
39 Until Charter rights took effect, the refusal of the
patient or substitute could be overruled by the review
board. The board contained lay, legal and medical
perspectives on it, however, so this did not in theory
detract from the principle of scrutiny of the treatment
proposals of the attending physician.
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approaching the nearest relatives. While a partial solution should not necessarily be criticised
because it is not a total solution, the Ontario situation may here promise more than it delivers.
The difficulties of involving family members and carers formally in decision-making structures
have received some discussion in England. Particularly when the list of substitutes is fixed,
inappropriate results may occur. As an extreme case, a patient might quite reasonably not want a
parent informed of the particulars of their treatment, if the parent has been abusing the patient.
The Richardson proposals, reflected in the government white paper, proposes a system which
would reduce the formal role of nearest relatives, and instead create a more informal role for
nominated persons, appointed by the patient if competent and a review tribunal if not.40 While the
role in Ontario is more formal, the appointment system is much as the government and the
Richardson Committee envisage. The green paper raises questions about the mechanics of
appointment,41 unanswered in the white paper; the government might do well to consult with the
Ontario review tribunal regarding practicalities.
Community Treatment Orders
There has been no tradition of community treatment orders as such in Ontario. The approach of
the Ontario legislation, which separates capacity and treatment from confinement, creates a
markedly different environment for the consideration of such orders. At least theoretically, the
provision of physical or mental treatment of an incapacitated person in the community has not
posed problems, as it may be performed on the consent of a substitute. Further, when treatment
cannot be enforced on a non-consenting competent patient in a psychiatric facility, it is
unsurprising that it similarly cannot be enforced in the community. 
Brian’s Law introduced what it describes as a community treatment order, in 2000. In Ontario, as
in England, political pressure had been towards further control of persons with mental health
problems in the community, and in particular those ceasing prescribed treatment. The act itself
was named in memory of Brian Smith, an individual killed by such a person. 
Certainly, realities must be acknowledged: the act brings these patients into a new legal regime,
subjecting them to particular professional scrutiny, and creating practical pressures to conform to
treatment proposals. At least on paper, however, the Ontario model is not so much about enforcing
a treatment programme on an unwilling patient, as it is about the provision of a coherent
programme of after-care to those in particular need. There is no Ontario equivalent to the English
right to after-care under section 117; if such care is to be required, the CTO is the only mechanism
to do so. The intention in the drafting of the provisions seems to be to require doctors and the
patient (or the patient’s substitute decision-maker, if the patient lacks capacity) to reach an agreed
solution embodied in a community treatment plan as to what treatment is appropriate in the
community. It is available only if the patient has been an in-patient in a psychiatric facility on two
or more separate occasions, or for a cumulative period of 30 days or more in the previous three
years, or has previously been subject to a CTO in the previous three years. If the subject is not at
the time of the order an in-patient, the physician must determine that the patient meets the criteria
for compulsory admission under subsection 15(1) or 15(1.1), discussed above. In addition, it must
be determined that the person is able to comply with the community treatment plan; that the care
40 Richardson Report, para 12.17-23; white paper, para
5.5-9.
41 Green paper, para. 10.10.
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and treatment proposed is available in the community; and, in section 33.1(2)(c), that ‘if the person
does not receive continuing treatment or care and continuing supervision while living in the
community, he or she is likely, because of mental disorder, to cause serious bodily harm to himself
or herself or to another person or to suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration of the
person or serious physical impairment of the person’42 If these conditions are met, so long as the
subject agrees (or the subject’s substitute, if the subject is incapable), the CTO takes effect. It runs
for six months, and is subject to renewal if the above conditions are still applicable. 
The statute is curiously silent about the scope of what may be included in a community treatment
plan. Clearly, a regimen of medicine would be possible; but it is unclear how far the plan may
extend outside the medical sphere and into the realms of social care, contact with services and
accommodation.
The subject of the order may request a re-assessment of the situation at any time. Alternatively,
consent of the subject or the substitute may be withdrawn on 72 hours notice. In either case, the
attending physician may terminate the treatment order following a review of the individual’s
condition, if appropriate. If the physician believes that the subject is failing to comply with the
order, an assessment may be ordered under section 15, the usual entry route to civil confinement,
but only if the risks of bodily harm, physical or mental deterioration or physical impairment
identified above are thought to exist, and if reasonable efforts have been made to assist the subject
in complying with the order and warning of the possibility of admission if the order is not
complied with. 
The CTO also places responsibilities on the treatment providers named in the order. While the new
section 33.6 of the Mental Health Act exempts treatment providers from liability for default of
others in the provision of the treatment, it makes no such exception for treatment which the named
treatment provider is charged with providing himself or herself under the order. This suggests quite
a different approach from that of the English court in Clunis v. Camden and Islington HA,43 where the
court specifically denied any duty of care either in breach of statutory duty or in negligence for the
supervision of a patient under section 117 aftercare. Such a duty of care would presumably be
found in Ontario. As such, the Ontario CTO can be seen as enforcing standards of care from
treatment providers as much as enforcing compliance in the patient population. This, again, is a step
beyond what is proposed for England. The Richardson Report does propose that rights to
assessment and to aftercare would exist, but there is no indication how these would be enforced.
Certainly, there is no suggestion that the failure to assess or provide aftercare would lead to civil
liability. After the decision in Clunis, it is difficult to see that such an amendment can be intended
in the absence of express language. In the government white paper, even the formal right to an
assessment has been removed.
The CTO is a sufficiently new mechanism in Ontario that it is not yet possible to suggest how
successful it will be. There does seem to be considerable evidence that patient concordance with
treatment is affected by the standard and availability of that treatment. If that is indeed the case,
the Ontario approach may well be worth taking seriously.
42 Brian’s Law, s. 14, creating s. 33.1(2)(c) of the Mental
Health Act.
43 [1998] 3 All ER 180.
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The Consent and Capacity Review Board and Due Process Protections
The Consent and Capacity Review Board hears applications relating to capacity to consent to
treatment, financial capacity and challenging civil confinement. It also hears applications for review
lodged by informal patients as discussed above, and similar applications from allegedly
incapacitated adults objecting to being admitted by substitute decision-makers to nursing homes
and similar institutions. It can appoint substitute decision-makers for treatment and care purposes
when the patient lacks capacity and has not done so, and can provide directions as to the effect of
wishes expressed by the patient regarding care and treatment. As in England, the board generally
sits in panels of three: one psychiatrist, one lay person, and a lawyer as chair. Unlike the English
tribunals, standards are contained in the legislation as to expeditiousness. Hearings must
commence within seven days of the application unless all parties agree to a postponement. 
A decision must be communicated to the parties within one day of the completion of the hearing.
The parties must be informed of their right to request reasons, and if requested, reasons must be
handed down within two days.44 Once again, the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights on speedy determination of rights begins to look extraordinarily feeble, particularly when
the Ontario legislation is much more generous in the frequency of hearings to challenge
confinement.
The review board system is supported by a fairly extensive system of rights advice. Major
psychiatric facilities contain full-time rights advisors, and a network of part-time advisors exists in
the broader community. These individuals make routine visits when decisions of significant legal
import are made relating to the patient, such as a finding of incapacity, original civil confinement,
or the renewal of civil confinement. They do not in their rights advisor role represent patients
before the review board, although some of the part-time advisors in the community are lawyers
who may take on briefs in that capacity. Instead, rights advisors generally put patients wishing to
challenge decisions in contact with lawyers, who are funded through legal aid. This provision is in
addition to the services in large psychiatric facilities of professional patient advocates, who assist
patients with administrative matters outside the competence of review boards. While some rights
advisors are part time, this is not an ad hoc programme. It shares with the patient advocate
programme a small secretariat in Toronto. It is through this central office that the advisors are
trained and employed; they may work in the psychiatric facilities, but they are not employed by
them. This system has been in place for almost twenty years.
There was, briefly, a much more extensive and high-profile system of advocacy, Advocacy Ontario,
created by legislation in 1992. This was a government office intended to provide rights advice and
advocacy services to people with physical or mental disabilities, to act in the best interests of those
incapable of instructing advocates when the health or safety of those individuals was at stake, to
engage in public education, to press for systemic change to improve the situation of people with
disabilities, and generally to promote respect for the rights, freedoms, autonomy and dignity of
people with physical or mental disabilities. 
Advocates employed by the agency had considerable power. They were for example to have access
at all reasonable times to any place where a vulnerable person was thought on reasonable grounds
to be, although entry to private dwelling houses would be only by warrant of a Justice of the
Peace.45 They had access to the health and other administrative records relating to an individual
44 Health Care Consent Act 1996, s. 75. 45 Advocacy Act 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 26, s. 20-23.
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lacking capacity upon whose behalf they were acting, and otherwise by consent of the individual,46
as well as a facility’s administrative procedural manuals and records for the purposes of systemic
advocacy.47 The office was to be overseen by a board of commissioners. Eight of the twelve
members of this board along with the chair were required by statute to be drawn from a list of
individuals nominated by groups representing people with physical or mental disabilities, to ensure
accountability to the users of advocacy services. To protect against potential co-option, Advocacy
Ontario was placed under the Ministry of Citizenship, removed from the Attorney-General and
Health Ministries which were responsible for the other legislation relating to mental health and
incapacity.
One can readily understand the logic behind Advocacy Ontario. Rights advice supported by legal
representation works in individual cases, with clients who have capacity to instruct. It is not
efficient at creating systemic change, however, and it is not effective for clients lacking capacity to
press for their own rights. When the rights in question are those relating to personal guardianship,
invoked because of a perception that an individual lacks capacity, it is obvious that an ability to
press for ones rights cannot be assumed. Further, it is simply not true that all carers are good carers.
Canadian estimates are that seven to ten per cent of elderly people suffer some form of physical,
mental, or financial abuse, generally at the hands of their families. One cannot assume that other
vulnerable people fare better. If the principles behind the Ontario reforms of the early 1990s were
to be meaningful, the logic goes, appropriate support services had to be put in place.
Sadly, Advocacy Ontario was not a success. The reasons are manifold. It became a political issue,
associated in the public mind with a government which had become deeply unpopular by the time
Advocacy Ontario was up and running. The unpopularity was articulated in a variety of ways. It
was perceived as over-funded and profligate. It was perceived as overly interfering in the private
lives of Ontario’s families, caring for their loved ones. While it is true that the powers accorded
were significant, it is not in fact obvious that they were excessive. If the people at risk in the
community were to be protected from abuse, for example, a process to get a warrant to enter a
private dwelling seems to be a necessity, but in Ontario, as in England, the risks to which vulnerable
people are subjected in the family and in other ‘safe’ environments are not something that many
politicians are prepared to tackle. The first chair of Advocacy Ontario, a former shadow health
minister and former user of psychiatric services, was hailed with broad enthusiasm upon his
appointment. As the stock of the government in general and Advocacy Ontario in particular fell,
he became perceived as a purely political appointment. The problems were not all perceptual,
however. Appointments to the advisory board and to the Commission were apparently chosen to
reflect the diversity of views relating to advocacy and patient rights issues. While this might have
been effective in other circumstances, the board sadly seemed incapable of working together.
Under these stresses, Advocacy Ontario had largely imploded before a new government finally
abolished it, shortly after an election in 1995.48
The result is problematic. There is now in Ontario no systemic mechanism in place to ensure that
the law is being followed. As rights advisors act only on competent instructions, they have little
effect for persons unable to provide such instructions. For those persons, advocacy services are
largely absent, and the honour system seems to be relied upon for the application of the law. 
46 Advocacy Act 1992, s. 24.
47 Advocacy Act 1992, s. 26.
48 See S.O. 1996, c. 2, s. 72.
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The English government has in the green paper agreed to consider the provision of advocacy in a
mental health context. The existing Ontario model, and Advocacy Ontario, provide a mixture of
success and failure. We might well learn from more detailed study of this experience.
Problems
From the foregoing, it will be clear that there is much for English analysts to consider. 
The overarching structure of the Ontario legislation is designed to take into account both patient
rights and safety of the public and the patient. These are central to the concerns of the government
in its green paper and of the Richardson Committee. While there may still be some problems with
enforcement mechanisms, the presence and efficacy of the Ontario rights advice and review board
structure does provide the English onlooker with cause for pause.
There are, of course problems, real and apparent. The major theoretical difficulty with applying
the Ontario system to England is that Ontario’s Mental Health Act expressly acknowledges a
policing role of psychiatric confinement, based on dangerousness rather than the need for or
availability of treatment. Theoretically, it would be possible for patients to be detained in
psychiatric facilities ad infinitem, untreated because there is no effective treatment, or because they
are competent and refuse consent, or because they lack capacity and refused the required treatment
prospectively. The concern is that the ethos of the facility would change from hospital to patient
warehouse. 
Certainly, the express acknowledgement of dangerousness rather than treatability as the criterion
for confinement does have a symbolic importance, but it is easy to overstate the difference with
the current English system. After all, English statute law allows confinement not just on health
grounds, but also for the ‘safety of the patient or for the protection of other persons’, a
dangerousness criterion, albeit coupled with the alternative best interest criterion of ‘health’.
There is further no express treatability requirement for either severe mental impairment or mental
illness, but only for the small minority of cases which are categorised as psychopathic disorder or
(non-serious) mental impairment. The requirement of treatability rather than dangerousness as a
prerequisite for involuntary admission in England is thus already largely a myth. The Ontario
legislation is more specific in its articulation of how dangerousness is to be determined, but it is
not obviously theoretically different for that.
In practice, the concern seems ill-founded, since virtually no competent patients in Ontario
psychiatric facilities refuse all treatment. Ontario facilities have simply not become warehouses of
patients ‘rotting with their rights on’, any more than their English counterparts. Certainly, some
patients refuse some treatments, requiring negotiation between doctor and patient towards an
agreed treatment regime. While this may result in some compromise on what are perceived by the
doctors as medical best interests, the increased communication between doctor and patient which
is implied has its own advantages. It ensures that the patient is more involved in the development
of the treatment plan, at least in theory meaning that the patient has a greater emotional stake in
the resulting deal. This should in turn mean better rates of treatment continuation – a desirable
medical result.
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The cost of the review board structure is an obvious area of curiosity, but it does not seem
exorbitant. The Ontario Consent and Capacity Review Board received 3091 applications in 1998-
9, resulting in 1785 hearings. The cost of this to the taxpayer was just over $CDN 2 million, or
about £900,000.49 In this period, roughly 15,000 people (excluding criminal confinements) were
involuntarily admitted to psychiatric facilities in the province. The higher number of confinements
in England would militate towards an increase in this figure,50 but the higher population density
would counteract this to some degree, as transportation costs to get board members to hearings
would be reduced. The cost hardly seems excessive, for provision of an efficient tribunal structure.
The more severe criticisms relate to the key terms of the legislation. It is all very well to focus on
dangerousness as the criterion of confinement, but even after the closer criteria of the Ontario
legislation, dangerousness is notoriously unpredictable. Studies generally find that between half
and three quarters of those predicted to be dangerous by psychiatric professionals do not in the
end turn out to be violent.51 Capacity is similarly an extremely slippery concept. And while the
standards in the legislation appear to provide considerable power to patients, the effect of informal
coercion is not to be underestimated. In what sense, for example, is consent to treatment
‘voluntary’ as required by the Health Care Consent Act,52 if it is provided after the doctor explains
(perhaps quite accurately) that the treatment is the patient’s only hope of recovering far enough to
be released from the psychiatric facility, or if carers in the community will only accept the patient
if he or she agrees to medication? These problems exist equally in the current and proposed
English systems, however, and the closer wording and clearer structuring of the Ontario acts at
least provides an improvement on the vague English legislation in these regards. The fact that it is
only a partial solution does not necessarily justify extreme criticism, given what else is on offer.
Conclusion
Admittedly, the Ontario acts have their problems. At the same time, they do seem to provide a
coherent system, which takes into account the variety of interests and concerns under discussion
in the current reform debate. The risk is not merely that the government may re-invent the wheel
in the to-ing and fro-ing leading up to mental health reform, but perhaps more important, that they
may not re-invent it very well. The Ontario example provides a wealth of experience which should
be tapped. The English commentators and legislators would do well to give it further heed.
49 My thanks to David Hoff of the Ontario Consent and
Capacity Review Board for providing this information.
50 In England, just over 25,000 people were civilly
confined under part II of the Mental Health Act.
51 For surveys of the relevant literature, see P. Bowden,
‘Violence and Mental Disorder’, in N. Walker (ed),
Dangerous People, (London: Blackstone, 1996), J.
Monahan, ‘Risk Assessment of Violence among the
Mentally Disordered: Generating Useful Knowledge’,
11 International Journal of Law and Mental Health
(1988) 249, J. Monahan, ‘The Prediction of Violent
Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and
Policy’, 141 American Journal of Psychiatry (1984)
10. Further, factors such as race, sex and class appear to
be among the best predictors of dangerousness, raising
profound discrimination questions as to how
dangerousness can or should be used in social policy
relating to mental illness: see S. Wessely, ‘The
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52 Section 11(1).
